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Abstract 
This article develops a methodology for the evaluation of land administration 
systems. We propose a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators with benchmarks 
for each one of them that signal possible venues to improve the administration’s 
structure and budgetary/management arrangements, in order to bring about the 
following goals: (1) to contribute to public sector financing through taxes; (2) to 
encourage the productive and sustainable use of land, and (3) to facilitate access to land 
for low-income citizens. This methodology was applied to the cases of Honduras and 
Peru in order to refine our draft evaluation indicators, while evaluating the systems of 
both countries. Here we present the final refined indicators and benchmarks, and the 
conclusions from both case studies. 
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1. Introduction 
There are two conventional definitions of what constitutes a land administration 
system. According to the United Nations (UN-ECE, 1996), the land administration 
system encompasses the “processes of recording and disseminating information about 
the ownership, value and use of land and its associated resources.” On the other hand, 
Dale and McLaughlin (1999) add land use regulation and land tax collection to their 
definition. Therefore, these authors distinguish between the (broader) land 
administration system, and the land information system. Since it is the entire system of 
information, intervention, and regulation tools that enables the state to have an impact 
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on land tenure, land use, and land value, we even extend the definition used by Dale and 
McLaughlin so as to also include land market regulations and land-related subsidies 
(land subsidies can be interpreted as a negative tax on land). 
Also, the academic literature uses the term “land” with two different meanings. 
Land is often used as it is commonly known, i.e. as any part of the earth's surface not 
covered by a body of water. But it is sometimes used referring also to the buildings 
attached to it. In this article, we will use this second broader meaning because public 
administration laws, tools, policies and agencies normally target buildings and land as a 
whole.  
Once we have defined the object of this paper, we need to address the question of 
why it is important to evaluate it. On the one hand, land is a crucial economic and social 
asset. For example, there is broad consensus on that access to shelter is a fundamental 
civil right, and one cannot conceive firms or investments without land. However, on the 
other hand, the need for a formal land administration system is subject to debate. There 
are, in fact, numerous studies that conclude that the formalization of land property rights 
does not have a significant economic or social impact in less developed regions, but 
which have developed sufficiently secure and transferable informal property rights 
(Migot-Adhola et al., 1993; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994; Katz, 2000; Otsuka and 
Quisumbing, 2001). 
These results can be explained using the economic theory that tries to explain the 
fundamental mechanisms of economic development. In a less developed economy, 
where productivity and specialization are low and most exchanges take place on a 
personal basis, the need for a formal administration system is not demanding.  However, 
in order to enhance specialization and productivity, and therefore economic 
development, it is necessary that market size grow based on impersonal exchanges. 
This, in turn, requires a formal public system that defines, regulates and enforces 
property rights so as to reduce transaction costs (North, 1990). 
Having clarified the need for a public apparatus that administers the rights and 
obligations of an asset as fundamental to society as land is, it makes sense to consider 
whether this public apparatus is functional or not and whether it is fulfilling the 
objectives for which it is designed.  
To date, and to our knowledge, there have been two important international efforts 
to cross-country evaluate land administration systems. In 2002, the World Bank and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) financed a comparative 
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study that included 17 developing countries and six developed countries. This was the 
first international survey to elaborate indicators on several features of land information 
systems that can be used to make comparisons. However, the study has three important 
shortcomings. First, it is based on the limited UN-ECE definition of the land 
administration system and hence it does not include indicators related to key 
intervention and regulation tools that a government has. Secondly, the study uses a set 
of qualitative indicators with open questions lacking a benchmark framework. As a 
consequence, the qualitative section is basically descriptive, and cannot be used to 
derive policy conclusions regarding effectiveness or efficiency of the systems. Finally, 
while the study includes a set of quantitative indicators supported by an explicit 
benchmark framework, the data required for these indicators is difficult to collect, and is 
not available in most of the developing countries included in the sample (see Burns et 
al, 2006).  
The other study was jointly developed by the Melbourne University, the United 
Nations General Secretariat, and the International Federation of Surveyors (see 
Rajabifard et al, 2007 and http://www.cadastraltemplate.org). This research project used 
both quantitative and qualitative indicators to compare the national administration 
systems of 42 countries. Same as above, the project is restricted to the analysis of the 
information system, and it does not include a benchmark framework that would allow 
obtaining policy implications from the qualitative and quantitative indicators. However, 
in this case most quantitative data from developing countries is available, resulting in a 
useful descriptive study of the land information systems of 42 countries from the five 
continents.  
Finally, it is also worth mentioning the creation in 2004 of The Inter-American 
Alliance for Real Property Rights, financed by the USAID. The Alliance seeks, among 
other goals, to evaluate the land administration systems of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. In so doing, it has developed an evaluation tool with many 
indicators, the so called Alliance Blueprint, but there are no final results publicly 
available yet. In any case, the Blueprint has the same problems as the ones already 
mentioned (see http://www.landnetamericas.org). 
Here we propose a methodology that is based on the experience derived from the 
above studies, and which seeks to address all the mentioned problems. Therefore, we 
will evaluate both the information tools – the Registry and Cadastre – and the 
intervention tools - taxes, subsidies and regulations -, using a broad set of quantitative 
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and qualitative indicators which can be easily collected in developing countries, and 
comparing each one of them with an explicit benchmark.  
The principal goal of this article will be to provide an evaluation methodology that 
enables the identification of aspects from national land administration systems subject 
to improvement according to international standards.  The most important novelty is the 
use and justification of benchmarks for each indicator. Some of them can certainly be 
subject to criticism, but we believe that making them explicit is a necessary step in 
order to be able to derive policy implications from these types of studies. Actually, we 
believe that a debate on the benchmarks could move forward the applied research 
agenda related to land administration. This article aims to be a step in this direction. 
The methodology is then applied to Honduras and Peru in order to obtain specific 
policy conclusions for these countries, but also in order to test and refine the 
methodology itself. Due to space constraints, we only include the main conclusions and 
recommendations from these case studies. Readers interested on them can contact the 
corresponding author to receive full versions, written in Spanish. Since the most 
important bottlenecks found were similar for both countries, we find it plausible that 
other developing countries face similar problems, and therefore we have included some 
final practical recommendations to improve land administration systems. 
 
2. A methodological approach to evaluate national land administration systems 
A study that seeks to evaluate a system must start defining the main goals or results 
expected from the system, as well as the tools available to reach them. In our case, we 
present three results and four tools. The three results are as follows:  (1) to contribute to 
public sector financing; (2) to encourage the productive and sustainable use of land, and 
(3) to facilitate low-income groups’ access to land (including shelter). The available 
tools are: taxes, subsidies, regulations and the land information system. The first three 
tools are related to government intervention while the Registry and the Cadastre are the 
public information tools that enable the entire system to function properly (see box 1). 
The proposed methodology is divided into two separate parts. The first one is 
descriptive, explaining the basic properties and history of the land administration 
system, in order to provide the framework that will enable us to carry on the second 
part, which lays out the evaluation indicators and benchmarks. 
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2.1. First part: the description of the land administration system 
Box 2 contains the index that we have used to carry on the description of the land 
administration system for each country. The first section summarizes how the 
government functions, paying special attention to the degree of government and fiscal 
decentralization. The goal is to explain the institutional framework in which the land 
administration system is inserted.  The first chapters describe the government system at 
the supranational, national and sub-national levels, indicating principal responsibilities 
and available budgets for each level. The chapter on government financing breaks down 
the public budget, differentiating at least between own revenues, transfers from other 
government levels, and from public debt. 
The second section describes the situation of land use, land access and land markets. 
The chapter on land use describes the evolution of agricultural, livestock, forestry, agro 
forestry, water, artificial, and any other soil potential use areas. The principal features 
that we will try to analyze is whether there has been an intensification process of land 
use (towards more intensive crops or towards artificialization) and, if data on the 
optimum potential uses of the land is available, the quantification of land under and 
over exploitation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. Land administration system: Objectives and tools 
 
     Objectives or expected      Tools: 
outcome: 
       Intervention  Information 
 
1) Government financing    Taxes   Registry 
 
2) Productive and sustainable land use  Subsidies  Cadastre 
 
3) Low-income citizen’s access to land  Regulations 
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Box 2. Index for the description of the land administration system 
 
SECTION I: STATE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING   
 
1.  Introduction: bases and political organization of the national government 
1.1. Legislative power 
1.2. Executive power 
1.3. Judicial power 
 
2. Territorial division of the state 
2.1. The regional administration 
2.2. The local administration 
2.3. Membership in international bodies 
 
3. State financing 
 3.1. Central state financing 
 3.2. Regional state financing 
 3.3. Local state financing 
 
 
SECTION II: ACCESS TO LAND, LAND USE AND LAND MARKETS 
 
4. The use of land 
 
5. Access to land and land markets 
 5.1. Access to rural land and rural land markets 
 5.2. Access to urban land and urban land markets 
 
 
SECTION III: THE LAND ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM 
 
6. The Land Registry 
6.1. Historical evolution 
6.2. Current functioning 
 
7. The Cadastre 
7.1. Historical evolution 
7.2. Current functioning 
7.3. Cadastral value assessment 
7.4. Cadastral data updating 
7.5. Coordination with other spatial information systems  
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On the chapter on access to land and land markets, both urban and rural, we look for 
data on the proportions of each tenancy option (ownership, lease, or possession), and of 
each access option (inheritance, sale, public project, squatting, handed over or lease). 
We also try to include information on the evolution of average prices and on the 
percentage of households that engage in sale and rental transactions. Finally, we search 
for data on the proportion of households who lack access to rural land and urban 
housing. All this information will be used in order to gain knowledge regarding access 
types and problems, degree of land market activity, and evolution of prices versus 
headline inflation.  
Once general state functioning has been described, and land access, transfer, and use 
problems identified, the third part describes the national land administration system. 
Several chapters in this section begin with an overview of the historical process, in 
order to enhance our understanding of the problems related to institutional change. The 
chapter on the land Registry (also called the Juridical Cadastre) begins describing its 
origins, the evolution of the register’s and notary public’s roles, and the requirements 
needed for title registration.  It then describes in greater detail the current operation of 
 
8. Land taxes  
8.1. National land taxes 
8.2. Regional land taxes 
8.3. Local land taxes 
8.4. Land tax collection 
 
9. Land subsidies 
9.1. Historical evolution 
9.2. Current description 
 
10. Access to land policies 
10.1. Agrarian reforms 
 10.2. Access to housing policies 
 
11. Land market regulation 
 11.1. Land sales markets legislation  
 11.2. Land rental markets legislation 
11.3. Donation and inheritance legislation 
 
12. Land use regulation 
 12.1. National land use planning  
 12.2. Regional and local land use planning 
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the Registry, focusing on: its position within the general public administration, 
registration principles, types of documents that can be registered, requirements for first 
time registration (adjudication of title) and transfer registration, type of information 
registered, registration costs, and technologies available to facilitate information to 
citizens.  
The chapter on the Cadastre (also called the Fiscal Cadastre) also begins with a 
historical overview that includes its origins, the technology used, and the type of 
collected data. In order to describe its current performance we study its organizational 
structure and responsibilities, the type of data collected, its coverage, the administrative 
use of the cadastral reference, and the currency of photographic and digitalized data.  
We also include subsections that illustrate how cadastral value assessments, ownership 
and use updates, and coordination with other spatial information systems are conducted 
by the Cadastre.  
The chapter on taxes describes all taxes levied on land, specifying what 
administrative level is in charge of collection and how the tax base and applicable rates 
are calculated. We also include information on the available deductions and exemptions. 
Using the most recent data, we present information on the collection of each tax and 
their rate with respect to total tax collection by each administrative level. Finally, we 
classify taxes according to two levels: those that tax transfers and those that tax property 
on a yearly basis. When possible, the latter taxes are broken down into two categories: 
taxes on rural versus urban property, and taxes on property used as homestead versus 
taxes on property not used as homestead. All this information will be used to evaluate 
taxes, as we will see below.  
The chapters on land-related subsidies and access to land policies briefly describe 
objectives, type of support (grant, subsidized credit, etc.), financing rules (eligibility 
criteria and the restrictions imposed on the beneficiaries), public budget that has been 
executed, obstacles to policy implementation, and outcomes attained from these policies 
(total number of beneficiaries, resulting land distribution, etc).  
The chapter on urban and rural land market regulation analyzes the legislation that 
rules these markets. It is important to incorporate here the description of possible 
restrictions to transfers commonly imposed by public access program such as land 
reform and housing projects.  
Finally, the chapter on land use regulation summarizes the applicable legislation 
both at the sector level (roads, rivers, forestry conservation, etc) and at the territorial 
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level (land use planning). We also indicate which public administrative level is 
responsible for the elaboration, financing, monitoring, and control of these plans, as 
well as current outcomes, and the interaction of land use planning with other policies 
with a territorial approach. 
As we have already mentioned, the objective of this descriptive part is to understand 
how the land administration works and how has it come to work this way (section 
three), together with the description of the main elements on which the administration 
system tries to exert influence on (collection of land taxes, land use, land markets, and 
access to land; sections one and two). 
  
2.2. Second part: the evaluation of land administration systems 
One way to evaluate land administration systems could be based on the descriptive 
analysis summarized in the previous section. In this sense, we would try to relate 
current (or the evolution of) results on land taxes, land use, access to land, and land 
markets with the tools that the public administration has applied (Registry, Cadastre, 
taxes, subsidies, and regulations). However, this strategy would suffer from three 
important practical problems. First, much of the searched data on results described on 
the first and second sections will probably not be available for developing countries. 
Secondly, even when the data is available, we do not have known benchmarks for most 
of these results that would enable us to conclude whether goals had been achieved or 
not - for example, what is the optimum level of land market activity or access to land. 
Finally, even if we had the data and benchmarks related to results, it would be 
complicated to relate each result with a tool, since we often have several tools in place 
at any time, all of them influencing the same result.  As a consequence, it is highly 
difficult in practice to categorically assert whether a tool is being effective or not. 
Nevertheless, what we can do is to analyze each tool independently and assess 
whether it is contributing or not to the outputs or immediate goals - as against results - 
that the tool is designed to affect. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to build a 
set of qualitative and quantitative indicators for each tool as well as a benchmark for 
each indicator.  
In the case of qualitative indicators, we define an optimum benchmark value for 
each of them, based on broad international consensus on what constitutes the best 
practice. Building a set of quantitative indicators is more complex since there are 
practically no references as to what the best practice is.  In order to (partially) resolve 
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this issue, we compare the value for each country with the average and the standard 
deviation that the value shows in developed countries. This comparison enables us to 
determine whether a specific feature of the system is close or far from average 
developed country practice, which gives us an idea of the degree of development of that 
feature.   
To develop this quantitative benchmarks we have used data compiled by 
international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, as 
well as information gathered by other land administration international surveys, such as 
those mentioned at the introductory section of this article. It is important to highlight 
that for some variables the international information does not include all the developed 
countries or it does not exist at all. We solve this last problem by using data from Spain 
whenever there is no quantitative international data. We hope that the methodology 
proposed here serves as a basis for future case studies, which will give us more precise 
and universal quantitative benchmarks. In this study we specify the source of each 
benchmark so as to be accordingly cautious when interpreting outputs.  
Finally, within each tool we isolate structural indicators from output indicators. The 
former provide information relative to the institutional design features of the tool. The 
latter evaluate the effectiveness or efficiency of each tool. This distinction allows us to 
discern whether it is necessary to undertake institutional changes (that generally involve 
legislation changes) from whether it is necessary to improve land administration 
agencies’ management practices or increase their budget. That is, if output values are far 
from the benchmark, but the institutional design is appropriate, we can conclude that it 
is necessary to improve management practices of the responsible agency and/or increase 
its public budget. 
To summarize, we propose a methodology based on the model “structure + 
management + budget ⇒ outputs”, but which exclusively analyzes structure and 
outputs. It would be useful to complete this methodological approach with a 
management performance assessment survey for each relevant land administration 
agency. This assessment tool would contribute to the identification of management 
practices versus budgetary problems. Our survey is limited to the distinction between 
institutional, and the other two types of shortcomings. In the following sections we 
describe and justify the set of qualitative and quantitative indicators, together with the 
benchmarks used. 
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2.2.1. Best practice in land information systems 
The information system is normally made up of the Registry (or Juridical Cadastre) 
and the Cadastre (or Fiscal Cadastre).  The Registry is the database that compiles the 
information on the legal aspects of the property, including legal ownership, spatial 
extent, charges and liens. The Cadastre is the geographical and alphanumerical database 
that describes the features, use and spatial coordinates of land parcels, as well as the 
current “administrative ownership” of the land. 
In many countries - mainly under common law - registering property is compulsory. 
In this case, administrative ownership equates legal ownership. However, in countries 
under civil law registration is voluntary, resulting in two different types of formal 
ownership: a legal one – recorded at the Registry - that will not encompass the entire 
territory, and an administrative one - recorded at the Cadastre - that includes (or aims to 
include) the totality of the national territory, in order to tax all land.  
This information system must provide reliable and current information on land 
ownership, use, and value. This is so because only if we know who owns what, how 
much it costs and how it is being used, will the government be able to effectively and 
fairly raise land taxes, and enhance the social, economic and environmental 
sustainability of land use. Moreover, current and reliable information on land rights is 
necessary, although probably not sufficient, to increase the size of formal land and 
credit markets (Feder, 1993 and Deininger, Zegarra and Lavadenz, 2003). 
There are three requisites that are necessary for the information system to be 
reliable: (1) the Registry must be the only definitive (or legal) source of ownership; (2) 
there must be a single cadastral parcel number, and (3) the Registry must require the 
cadastral parcel number for any registration of ownership. (See table 1 at the end of this 
section). 
Merging the Registry and the Cadastre in a single national or regional database 
could solve many coordination problems. Nevertheless, most countries (specially the 
ones with a civil law system) still have both agencies with varying degrees of 
decentralization. In any case, whatever the complexity and decentralization degree that 
the information system might have, it is necessary to rely on data integration 
mechanisms that avoid information inconsistencies between legal ownership and parcel 
information throughout the entire national territory.  In this sense we have added three 
institutional references: (1) it is compulsory to exchange all the relevant information 
between the Registry and the Cadastre; (2) there is only one administratively valid 
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Cadastre for each jurisdiction; and (3) the national or regional government regulates, 
subsidizes, and monitors the development of regional or municipal fiscal cadastres.  
Since there are many countries - such as Denmark, Honduras, Japan, Spain and Peru 
- where registration is not compulsory, we cannot compare data from the Registry and 
the Cadastre to determine the reliability and consistency of the information system. 
However, we can ask civil servants if they are aware of inconsistencies between both 
data bases, and gather data on total rural and urban coverage in both data sets. We will 
use two different quantitative benchmarks for the Registry, depending on whether 
registration is compulsory or voluntary (see table 2). 
For an information system to be updated the first requirement will be to make 
compulsory the notification to government authorities of both property transfers and 
changes in land use.  When this obligation does not refer to the registration of title at the 
Registry, it must be compulsory to provide such data to some other public agency, 
generally the Cadastre.  
Another requirement for proper updating is related to the cost imposed on the 
citizens to provide this information. If the cost is too high, the state is creating negative 
incentives towards providing this information. In this sense, we will measure the 
registration costs of titles and mortgages, including lawyer and notary fees. We also 
include indicators on the relative number of Registry and Cadastre offices relative to the 
size of the country and its population so as to use them as proxies for other transaction 
costs (see table 1). It is important to note here that register costs also include specific 
taxes that will be analyzed later, and might include other private costs, such as those 
related to surveyor mapping when a parcel is not properly mapped at the Cadastre 
(which is, for example, the case in Peru).  
An ideal indicator to assess the currency of the data would be to gather information 
on the percentage of land parcels or apartments that belong to an owner, or appear in the 
information system with a use, different from the current one. This could be done for 
example crossing new land cover maps with the cadastral information. Unfortunately, 
this information is normally not available, but we can use the age of the last systematic 
update of the cadastral map as another measure for currency (table 2). 
It is important to note that in all developed countries the Cadastre is either managed 
by a national agency or through regional agencies. The latter is common in countries 
with a federal government structure such as Australia, India, Germany and Switzerland. 
Given the difficulties inherent to the coordination of different public agencies, the 
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complexity of the Cadastre, and the scarcity of resources commonly suffered by many 
local public agencies in developing countries, we recommend to manage the Cadastre at 
the regional or national level. In other words, the Cadastre is a vital informational tool 
for many different public policy purposes, and leaving its management to municipalities 
can result in highly heterogeneous data quality. 
We have also included the relationship between cadastral and market land values as 
an output indicator of the currency and the reliability of the data contained in the 
information system. While this data is difficult to obtain, we can at least calculate a 
proxy based on information provided by cadastral surveyors.  Since cadastral values 
should reflect market values, much lower cadastral values imply insufficient updating, 
while broad differences between different places would suggest lack of reliability. This 
information is needed to determine whether potential tax collection problems are due to 
the tax rate used, to insufficient cadastral coverage or updating, or to deficient land 
value assessments. 
Useful policy planning tools can be obtained if data on land use and land ownership 
obtained from the land information system is integrated with other spatial information 
such as poverty maps, public infrastructure or environmental risks. Many public 
agencies are beginning to do this, using Geographical Information System (GIS) 
technologies, so we will add another best practice indicator on this issue.  
Finally, we can also evaluate some features of the information system related to 
efficiency, i.e. with the ability to obtain some output at the lowest possible cost. In this 
sense, there is some consensus on institutional features like that: (1) the Registry 
maintenance costs should be financed through clients’ fees, and (2) the maintenance 
tasks of the Cadastre should be carried out by licensed private cadastral surveyors rather 
than by public staff (Dale and McLaughlin, 1999). The output indicators related to 
efficiency that we have selected are the self-financing capacity of the Registry, the 
Cadastre annual variable cost per land parcel (we do not include the Registry costs 
because in countries where they are financed through clients’ fees there are normally no 
statistics available), and the total time spent to register a property transfer in the 
Registry (table 2). 
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Table 1. The evaluation of the Land Information System structure 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
The Registry is the single and complete source of 
ownership 
Yes B.P. 
There exists a single cadastral parcel number Yes B.P. 
Data 
reliability 
The cadastral parcel number is required for ownership 
registration 
Yes B.P. 
Registering ownership at the Registry or the Cadastre is 
compulsory 
Yes B.P. 
Registering changes in land use is compulsory Yes B.P. 
% (Transfer registration cost / property value1) ≤ 1% (2.2) WB, 20062 
% (Transfer notary public cost / property value) ≤ 1.2% (2.7) WB, 2006 
# of Registry offices / 100,000 km2 x million people ≥ 25.5 (52.5) Burns et al, 
20063 
Data 
currency 
# of Cadastre offices / 100,000 km2 x million people ≥ 0.3 Spain 
Transferring of information between the Registry and 
the Cadastre is compulsory 
Yes B.P. 
There is a unique Cadastre with valid official records in 
each jurisdiction 
Yes B.P. 
Data 
reliability 
and 
currency 
The central government regulates, subsidizes and 
monitors the quality of regional or municipal cadastres 
Yes B.P. 
Multi  
purpose 
There is a single entity responsible for coordinating, 
supervising, and integrating all spatial data 
Yes B.P. 
The Registry maintenance costs must be financed 
through fee charges 
Yes B.P. 
Licensed private-sector cadastral surveyors take part in 
cadastral maintenance tasks 
Yes B.P. 
Efficiency 
There are licenses for private-sector cadastral surveyors Yes B.P. 
B.P. = Best Practice 
Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation 
1. Excluding notaries’ costs and taxes 
2. It includes data for every OECD country 
3. It includes values for Australia, England, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Scotland and Singapore 
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Table 2. The evaluation of Land Information System outputs 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
There are no inconsistencies between Registry and 
Cadastre data 
Yes B.P. 
% (registered urban area / total urban area 1) in 
countries where registration is optional 
72%(47) Cadastral 
Template, 20072 
% (registered urban area / total urban area) in 
countries where registration is compulsory 
99% (1.5) Cadastral 
Template, 20073 
% (cadastred urban area / total urban area) 100% Cadastral 
General 
Directorate, 
Spain 
% (registered rural area / total rural area) in 
countries where registration is optional 
82%(31) Cadastral 
Template, 2007 
% (registered rural area / total rural area) in 
countries where registration is compulsory 
99% (2.1) Cadastral 
Template, 2007 
Security 
% (cadastred rural area / total rural area) 100% Cadastral 
General 
Directorate, 
Spain 
Average years passed since the last general update 
of the rural cadastral map  
≤ 9 (14.37) Bird and Slack, 
20024 
Data 
currency 
Average years passed since the last general update 
of the urban cadastral map 
≤9 (14.37) Bird and Slack, 
2002 
% (Urban land cadastral value / market value) 
(range) 
100% (0%) B.P. Security 
and data 
currency % Rural parcel cadastral value / market value 
(range) 
100% (0%) B.P. 
Multi-
purpose 
Cadastral databases are integrated with other 
databases through a GIS 
Yes B.P. 
Registry maintenance costs are financed through fee 
charges 
Yes B.P. 
Total amount of time spent in registering property 
transfer (days) 
≤ 42 (53) WB, 2006 
Efficiency 
Cadastre annual variable cost / number of land 
parcels (US$) 
≤ 2.6 Cadastral 
General 
Directorate, 
Spain 
 B.P. = Best Practice 
Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation 
1. Ratios that refer to the number of land parcels (instead of area) can also be used.  
2. Data for Denmark, Hong Kong and Japan. These are the only developed countries in the sample where 
registration is not compulsory.  
3. It includes values for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Israel, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.  
4. It includes data on Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom. The study does not differentiate between urban and rural assessments. 
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2.2.2. Best practice in land taxes 
Land taxes should considerably contribute to government revenue, enhance social 
equity, promote environmentally sustainable activities, and facilitate low-income 
groups’ access to land.  
In order to analyze the principal features of land taxes and its consequences, it is 
necessary first to distinguish between those taxing ownership and those taxing the 
transfer of rights. Taxes on ownership are levied on an annual basis and, if sufficiently 
high, can enhance land supply (thereby decreasing prices) and land use productivity. On 
the contrary, taxes on transfers increase transaction costs, thereby increasing prices and 
diminishing land market activity.  
Second, identifying whether land is used or not as habitual homestead is necessary 
to support social equity and to facilitate low-income groups’ access to land. If the 
property is used as homestead, ownership tax rates should be lower so as to guarantee 
access and occupancy.  
Taking the previous aspects into account, we propose the following optimum 
benchmarks: the annual property ownership tax rate (a structural indicator) and total 
collection (an outcome or result indicator in this case, since the output coincides with 
the goal) from land that is not used as principal homestead should be high, while the tax 
rate and total collection from transfers should be low. Moreover, tax rates on productive 
activities that produce environmental damage should be higher. We will use these 
indications when comparing with international averages (see table 3). 
In most countries, the responsibility of annual land property tax collection is 
assigned to local governments or municipalities. In order to enhance such collection, 
incentives from the central government to local administrations, normally included in 
budget transfer rules, are seen as suitable tools (World Bank, 2003). Finally, in order to 
asses the contribution of land taxes to government finances, we use a set of indicators 
that measure the general capacity of the government to collect taxes, the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, and the relative weight of rural and urban land tax collection (table 4).  
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Table 3. The evaluation of the land tax structure 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
Property tax rate on rural land used as homestead (% 
of cadastral value) 1 
≤ 0.3-0.9% Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Property tax rate on rural land not used as homestead 
(% of cadastral value) 
≥0.3-0.9% Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Property tax rate on urban land used as homestead (% 
of cadastral value) 
≤0.4-1.1% Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Property tax rate on urban land not used as homestead 
(% of cadastral value) 
≥0.7-3.5% Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Total tax rate on land sales (% of contract value) ≤1.9% (2.4) WB, 2006 
There are differential rates for the promotion of 
economic activities 
Yes B.P. 
Real 
property 
access and 
productive 
and 
sustainable 
use of land 
There are differential rates for the promotion of 
environmentally sustainable use of land 
Yes B.P. 
Government 
financing 
The central government has implemented an incentive 
system for municipal tax collection 
Yes B.P. 
B.P. = Best Practice 
Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation 
 
Table 4. The evaluation of land tax outcomes 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
Annual taxes on land property / Total land taxes ≤31.3% Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Productive 
use and 
access 
Annual taxes on land not used as homestead / Total 
land taxes 
≥11.1% Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Total government taxes / GDP 36.3% (7.6) OECD, 2004 
Total taxes on land / GDP 1.9% (1.1) OECD, 2004 
Total taxes on land / total government taxes 5.5% (3.5) OECD, 2004 
Annual taxes on rural land / Annual taxes on land >> 2.4%2 Treasury 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Sub national taxes / total taxes 18.1 (12,4) OECD, 2004 
Government 
financing 
Annual municipality taxes on land /Total municipality 
revenues 
36.2%(31,6) OECD, 2004 
B.P. = Best Practice 
Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation 
1. Sum of all tax rates that are applied to the same concept. 
2. Tax collection on rural land parcels in Spain is very low because cadastral valuations have not been 
updated since 1976. 
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2.2.3. Best practice in land-related subsidies 
There is broad consensus on that, from an economic perspective, the existence of 
market failures produced by positive externalities justifies the adoption of subsidies. 
Such positive externalities take place when the private marginal benefit of producing a 
given good or service is lower than the social marginal benefit. As a result, the output 
level of an economy will be lower than the optimum social level. The opposite logic is 
applied to the justification of special taxes on certain economic activities that produce 
negative externalities. In both cases, the subsidy or the tax should be equal to the 
difference between the social and the private cost so as to make them equal.  
The principal shortcoming of this theoretical argument is the difficulties inherent in 
measuring social benefits and costs: How can we measure the social cost of pollution? 
Or how can we measure the social benefit of public health or technological innovation? 
Although many methodologies have been designed to cope with this problem - mostly 
in environmental economics - their practical application is expensive and highly 
inaccurate. The practical solution to this problem consists in subsidizing or establishing 
special taxes on those activities that generate the clearest externalities and in respect of 
which there is broad social consensus. Respecting taxes, examples include activities that 
produce clear environmental damage or involve health risks, such as taxes on polluting 
gases and on alcohol and tobacco products. Respecting subsidies, there are clear 
positive externalities in public infrastructures, research, education and training, public 
health, employment creation, and capital investment incorporating new technologies.  
Taking all these aspects into account we begin designing structural qualitative indicators 
(table 5). 
In practice, however, both the allocation and amount of subsidies are often 
determined, not by the search of social optima, but by the political pressure exerted by 
interest groups and/or in order to obtain competitive advantages at international 
markets. This is for example the case of high agricultural subsidies adopted by many 
developed countries, which are being highly criticized based on the distortion of world 
market prices that they produce. The problem with these subsidies comes from their 
negative impact on producers from the developing world that have to compete in a 
context of global trade liberalization, which has a direct effect on land use (a recent 
example can be the decrease in Mexican corn production as a consequence of the 
massive imports of corn from the United States after the creation of NAFTA). It is for 
this reason that we include data on agricultural subsidies in developed countries, not as 
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an indicator of good practice, but as to assess the potential threats to agricultural 
competitiveness in the analyzed developing country (table 6). 
We also include an indicator that reflects the percentage of total Ministry of 
Agriculture spending assigned to the provision of goods and services, i.e., the total 
ministry budget minus the administrative expenditure. This indicator tries to reflect the 
resource management efficiency of the Ministry of Agriculture. Given the difficulties to 
find information for a significant number of developed countries, we use as a 
benchmark the latest data of the European Commission agricultural budget. While the 
Spanish information is not very helpful because most of the responsibilities have been 
transferred to the European Union and to the Autonomous Communities (the regional 
political and administrative Spanish entities), the European Commission data is 
representative of a highly burocratic agency that employs approximately 24,000 well 
paid civil servants. 
Although, as it has been argued, the quantity and allocation of subsidies is often 
controversial, there is broad agreement on the need to design subsidies so as to provide 
the right incentives to efficiently use them and to introduce the least possible distortions 
in market prices. Moreover, we argue that it is necessary that their use and their 
flexibility are partial. We now explain both types of partialities. 
According to the theoretical argument that justifies the use of subsidies, these have 
to cover just for a part of total cost to make up for the difference between social and 
private benefits. Furthermore, a partial amount is an incentive for the beneficiary to take 
on costs and risks. Only in the specific case of public goods (where there is a clear 
social benefit but almost null private benefits) such as rural roads and research on non-
commercial issues, would the use of whole subsidies be justified on an economic basis.  
By partial flexibility we refer to subsidies that allow the beneficiary to select the 
productive activity (in order to not distort market prices) while requiring the compliance 
with a set of criteria that guarantee that the positive externality is indeed produced. As 
examples we cite the compulsory use of environmentally sustainable techniques, and 
formal labour contracts in order to be eligible for the subsidy.  
Finally, the need to subsidize access to housing for low-income citizens is justified 
by the right of any individual to enjoy access to decent housing, and by the need to 
prevent the proliferation of informal and marginal dwellings.  Housing subsidies, as the 
previous ones, should be partial in terms of quantity and flexibility. 
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Table 5. The evaluation of the structure of land-related subsidies 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
There are subsidies for investment that encourages a 
more efficient and sustainable use of rural land 
Yes B.P. 
% of Agriculture Minister expenditure allocated to 
investment on goods and services, public and private 
(total budget - administrative expenditure) 
86,4% European 
Commission's 
Directorate 
General for 
Agriculture in 
2006 
Productive use 
of land. 
Partial quantity and flexibility of rural investment 
subsidies (financing a given % of the investment, 
allowing free selection of the activity, but imposing 
sustainability criteria) 
Yes B.P. 
There are subsidies for the improvement  of and access 
to housing for low-income citizens 
Yes B.P. Access to land 
Partial quantity and flexibility of housing subsidies Yes B.P. 
B.P. = Best Practice 
 
Table 6. The evaluation of the outputs from land-related subsidies  
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
Productive use Annual agricultural and livestock subsidies / total 
production area ($US/Ha) 1 
1,587 (2,924) OECD and  
FAO, 2003 
Access Annual housing subsidies (US$)/ (urban population x 
Gini)2 
194.0 
 
Housing 
Ministry, 
Spain 
Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation 
1.  This indicator does not attempt to represent best practice. It is used to show difficulties arising from 
low public support directed towards developing countries’ agricultural producers, in a context of free 
global trade. 
2. This indicator uses easily collectable data. The purpose is to proxy the funds granted by the 
government per each urban inhabitant who finds problems accessing housing. We use the Gini 
coefficient, an index of income inequality, and assume that the larger the coefficient (higher inequality) 
the larger the proportion of households that will have access to housing problems.  
 
2.2.4. Best practice in land use and land market regulations 
Land use and market regulations should enhance low-income households’ access to 
land, as well as the efficient and environmentally sustainable use of such resource. 
Regarding the optimum market regulation level, we base our approach on the 
microeconomic principle that the market is the most efficient mechanism for resource 
allocation, provided market failures have been properly dealt with. Externalities can be 
corrected by the adoption of subsidies and taxes, as stated above, while information 
asymmetries are normally addressed by the regulation of information that must be 
provided on products and services. 
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In the specific case of land rental markets, governments frequently protect the lessee 
by establishing or restricting the length of the contracts and the rent. Even tough there is 
no obvious consensus on these type of regulations, we will use the following criteria: 
(1) the initial rent must be set freely between the lessor and the lessee; (2) the minimum 
length of the contract should not be longer than a year; and (3) it can be established that 
the annual rent increase cannot be higher than inflation. We will then consider that 
government measures that do not comply with these criteria are not optimum because 
they are too rigid and can have a negative impact on market supply, thereby increasing 
prices (table 7). 
Regarding land sale markets, we argue that they must be completely free, including 
the sale of land previously purchased through public programs. Restrictions on the sale 
or rent of land acquired through public programs harm the beneficiaries of such 
programs (which loose flexibility to adapt to future conditions) and limit the market 
supply of land, thereby increasing prices. 
Land use regulations can be classified into three different types. First, there is a set 
of rules that apply everywhere and that regulate certain practices. Examples are the use 
of certain pesticides, and construction and waste disposal rules. Secondly, there are 
especially restrictive rules that apply to the use of specific areas and buildings 
throughout the whole national territory, such as protected parks and buildings that are 
considered historical or cultural landmarks. Thirdly, there are land use plans, which are 
generally developed by sub national governments, and which include land use 
regulations and public investment plans, differentiated by zone. 
While land use legislation is far from being a new phenomenon, it has been recently 
extensively developed due to increasing environmental awareness. The main problem in 
developing countries is not so much the regulation per se, but the difficulty in its 
enforcement (Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992). It is for this reason that our study 
focuses on the evaluation of how rules and land use plans are to be implemented. 
Taking into account that local governments are generally more vulnerable to 
citizens’ pressure than regional or national levels of government, we highlight two 
issues related to best practice. On the one hand, local government entities seem to be an 
appropriate venue for participative land use planning. On the other hand, one of the 
main reasons for the difficulty in enforcing land use rules is that they frequently directly 
contend with the economic interest of the owners, which can use their influence with the 
local government in order to not comply. This is the reason why we consider best 
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practice that an agency from a higher territorial order inspects proper enforcement of 
rules and plans of lower territorial order agencies (see tables 7 and 8). 
 
Table 7. The evaluation of the land regulatory structure 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
There are no legal restrictions to rural land sale Yes B.P. 
There are no legal restrictions to urban land sale Yes B.P. 
There are no legal restrictions to rural land leasing Yes B.P. 
Productive 
use and 
access to 
land 
There are no legal restrictions to urban land leasing Yes B.P. 
The government establishes obligations and rules for the 
elaboration of municipal or regional land use plans 
Yes B.P. 
The central or regional government supervises municipal or 
regional land use plans 
Yes B.P. 
The central or regional government inspects the compliance 
of real land use versus general rules and municipal or 
regional land use plans 
Yes B.P. 
Sustainable 
land use 
The central or regional government subsidizes the 
elaboration of municipal or regional land use plans  
Yes B.P. 
B.P. = Best Practice 
 
Table 8. The evaluation of land regulation outputs 
Goal Indicators Benchmark Source 
% of urban municipalities with land use plans 100% B.P. 
% of urban municipalities with participative land use plans 100% B.P. 
% of urban municipalities’ investment expenditure allocated 
to activities included in land use plans 
100% B.P. 
% of rural municipalities with land use plans 100% B.P. 
% of rural municipalities with participative land use plans 100% B.P. 
Productive 
and 
sustainable 
use of land 
% of rural municipalities’ investment expenditure allocated 
to activities included in land use plans 
100% B.P. 
B.P. Best Practice 
 
3. An application to the land administration systems of Peru and Honduras 
We have applied the proposed methodology to the analysis of the land 
administration systems from Peru and Honduras. Due to space restrictions we cannot 
include here the complete information from the case studies, so we will only present the 
main conclusions. Both studies are available in Spanish language upon request from the 
corresponding author. 
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Both countries share the same shortcoming: a bottleneck created by the institutional 
design of the Registry and Cadastre systems. Even though Honduras and Peru have 
undertaken important projects and institutional reforms in both systems, it is still very 
costly to register land, and information regarding to ownership, value and use of land is 
neither current nor reliable. The consequences are thin land formal markets, high 
inability to enforce regulation, and high land tax evasion.  
Registration of ownership involves high costs: granting a public deed before a 
notary public, paying land-related taxes and registration fees, and, in the case of Peru, 
paying for surveying when the area is not appropriately mapped at the Cadastre. This, in 
turn, implies that the vast majority of owners do not have incentives to register or obtain 
a title, and, as an alternative, many of them apply for public documents that are cheaper 
and easier to obtain (examples include private sale contracts authorized by a local judge 
and ownership certificates issued by the local government). Governments of both 
Honduras and Peru have tried to solve this problem by implementing land titling 
projects, but they appear to be ineffective and inefficient. Ineffective because after 
implementating a titling project, when a new transfer is made the title will be void if the 
new owner fails to register. Inefficient because establishing legal rights (titling) is a 
highly demanding and expensive process, requiring extensive legal and publicity work 
to asure definitive ownership. 
An easier and cheaper solution would be to simplify the property registration 
process and reduce its cost so that the benefits inherent to legal certainty and 
transferability are higher than registration costs. This measure would entail a substantial 
reduction in  notaries’ fees in Honduras (where fees represent 4% of the property value 
whereas the average for the OECD is 1.2%),  a decrease in the land transfer tax in Peru 
(where this tax is 2.8% while the average for the developed countries is 1,9%), and an 
increase in the number of Registry offices in both countries (Peru has 0.3 register 
offices per 100,000 squared kilometers and million inhabitants, and Honduras 3.3, while the 
average for developed countries is 25.5). Other government measures that would facilitate a 
reduction in registration costs are to develop full and up-to-date cadastral coverage that 
acts as geo-referential support and to directly intervene (as arbitrator, facilitator and/or 
financing source) when conflicts arise due to illegal land occupation. This has been the 
basic approach followed in most developed countries where registration is voluntary, 
obtaining 72% titled urban parcels and 82% titled rural parcels. After implementation of 
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several big titling projects Peru has 30% urban titled parcels and 45% titled rural 
parcels, while Honduras has 15% urban titled parcels and 21% titled rural parcels. 
Respecting the Cadastre, both Honduras and Peru have implemented coordination 
systems between agencies that develop cadastral maps as wells as a vast number of pilot 
projects for the elaboration of local cadastral maps. However, the outcome of these 
measures has been unsatisfactory. The three most urgent tasks are the following: (1) to 
eliminate the overlapping between agencies by assigning specific responsibilities to 
each of them; (2) to achieve full cadastral coverage (Peru has cadastral maps for just 
30% of urban land parcels and 45% of rural ones; Honduras does not even have data on 
the percentage of urban land parcels and it only has cadastral maps for 31% of the total 
rural area; while developed countries have universal cadastral coverage); and (3) to 
design permanent incentives and tools that enable the updating of information (neither 
Honduras nor Peru have data on the latest cadastre general updating).  
Due to the difficulties that arise from the integration and coordination of many 
(houndreds in Honduras, and thousands in the case of Peru) municipal agencies and to 
the vast budget and human capital differences between them, it is strongly 
recommended that they create a single national Cadastre. In the case of Peru, which is a 
big country immersed in an ongoing process of decentralization, they could also opt for 
regional cadastre agencies.  In this latter case, they should still have a national cadastre 
agency in charge of regulating, subsidizing, monitoring, and integrating the regional 
cadastres. 
Achieving universal and up-to-date cadastral coverage (tasks two and three above) 
is not expensive and demanding when conducted through satellite technologies. These 
are less precise than using field surveys or photogrammetry, but can be sufficiently 
accurate to calculate areas, while enabling the public administration to locate new 
construction sites and changes in land use. It is much more important to achieve 
universal and up-to-date cadastral coverage than to obtain extreme accuracy. 
As mentioned above, one of the main implications of having low cadastral coverage 
is the difficulties in collecting land taxes. While land taxes contribute on average to 
5.5% of total tax collection in developed countries, Peru and Honduras only collect 
around 2.5% from land taxes. 
An additional problem that affects both countries is the insignificant amount of 
public resource flows, in terms of the provision of public goods and services, and 
subsidies towards the rural areas. In fact, the Agricultural Ministers dedicate the vast 
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majority of their budget to administrative procedures (72% of the total budget in Peru 
and 91% in Honduras, compared to 14% of the European Commission's Directorate-
General for Agriculture and Rural Development). The Peruvian and Honduran 
agricultural producers suffer from a large competitive disadvantage due to the fact that 
they are immerse in the process of opening up their economies through free trade 
agreements, while developed countries highly subsidize both private and public goods 
in rural areas - mostly through public investment in infrastructure and agricultural 
subsidies. For example, agricultural producers at the OECD receive on average US$ 
1,587 per hectare and year, while Peruvian farmers receive US$ 30 and Honduran 
farmers US$ 10. This disadvantage reduces productive investment incentives with 
potentially devastating consequences on land use. Based on our analysis, we 
recommend increasing public investment towards productive activities in rural areas, 
both in public and private goods. In the latter case, it would be crucial to correctly 
design private subsidies, as described above. We also recommend the design of specific 
import tariffs against highly subsidized products from other countries, something that is 
currently allowed by the World Trade Organization.  
Finally, both Honduras and Peru are experiencing a "boom" in participative land use 
planning processes at all administrative territorial levels. While this is certainly not 
harmful per se, both countries still lack the necessary administrative tools to endow 
budgets and to monitor the implementation of the resulting plans. Consequently, 
administrative expenditures increase, and there is a high risk that citizens get even more 
disappointed after consultation processes that do not materialize in real investments. It 
would therefore be appropriate to decrease the overlapping of so many different plans, 
to increase the national budget allocated to subsidizing the remaining plans, and 
guarantee that there is a regional or central government entity that monitors the 
implementation of the plans at lower administrative levels. 
    
4. Final Remarks 
This article has developed a methodology for the evaluation of land administration 
systems. Unlike similar past efforts, we propose a set of quantitative and qualitative 
indicators with benchmarks for each one of them that signal possible venues to improve 
the administration’s structure and budgetary/management arrangements, in order to 
bring about the following goals: (1) to contribute to public sector financing through 
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taxes; (2) to encourage the productive and sustainable use of land, and (3) to promote 
access to land for low-income households. 
We are aware that some of the best practice qualitative benchmarks are suitable to 
criticism, while some of the international averages used as quantitative benchmarks 
might not be seen as appropriate for comparison. However, we believe that presenting 
and arguing benchmarks is a necessary step towards advancing a research agenda that is 
useful to land administration policy-makers. 
The methodology was applied to Honduras and Peru in order to refine our draft 
instruments, while evaluating the systems of both countries. In this sense, the 
preliminary methodology was modified to incorporate changes as we encountered 
difficulties in obtaining data or we found relevant additional information. We have 
sought to develop a methodology that covers the complexity of the administration 
system and that could be easily and inexpensively implemented in developing countries. 
Regarding the evaluation of the Honduran and Peruvian land administration 
systems, we came up with seven recommendations that we also believe can be 
applicable to other countries: 
1. Simplify the land registration process and reduce its cost. In the short run, the 
change could run into opposition from the notary publics or the Finance Ministry, 
since they would get lower fees and taxes per registration. However, in the long run, 
the increase in the number of registrations could result in higher fee and tax 
collection for both the notaries and the Finance Ministry. 
2. Suppress cadastral overlapping so as to create a single cadastre with reliable records 
within its jurisdiction.  To ensure its reliability, it is preferable to create a single 
Cadastre at the national level (or at the regional level in countries with federal 
government systems). 
3. Use satellite technologies to achieve universal and up-to-date cadastral coverage at a 
low cost.  
4. Reduce tax rates on real property transfers, and increase annual ownership tax rates 
on properties that are not used as homestead. These measures would encourage the 
development of land markets and facilitate access to land for low-income groups. 
Expanding the tax base through a universal and up-to-date Cadastre and proper 
control of tax evasion are also the cornerstones to increase land tax collection.  
5. Significantly increase the percentage of public expenditure allocated to financing 
private and public investments benefiting land-related entrepreneurial investments. 
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Special care must be taken in the design of subsidies for private investments, 
considering the following guidelines: (1) guarantee that only a part of the 
investment is financed; (2) prevent specific sector biases that distort market activity; 
(3) establish a transparent and technical selection process; and (4) use technical 
requirements (related, for example, to the use of sustainable production 
technologies, human capital development and creation of formal jobs) on how to use 
the subsidies. If the government cannot enforce these guidelines, it is probably 
desirable to prioritize investment in public goods such as communication, irrigation, 
and market place infrastructures, since such infrastructure is less prone, by 
definition, to cooptation by particular private groups. 
6. Compromise public funds to finance the execution of investment proposals resulting 
from participative land use planning processes. The implementation of such projects 
should be controlled by public entities at a higher territorial level, and made publicly 
available to allow for citizen monitoring. 
 
The results from the case studies were presented in September and October 2007 
before land administration experts in Tegucigalpa (Honduras), Lima (Peru) and 
Washington D.C. (United States), generating heated debates about two issues that we 
would like to highlight to finish the article. One of these topics obviously was the 
appropriateness of land titling projects. Our vision is that we have to carefully 
distinguish between countries that make title registration compulsory and voluntary. In 
the latter case, which applies for the majority of Latin America, it makes more sense to 
make a strong effort to attain universal cadastral coverage, and facilitate (make cheaper 
and easier) registration of title, than to try to reach universal title coverage via special 
titling projects. First, if people do not voluntarily title their land it means that benefits 
derived from registering property (security and transferability of ownership) are lower 
than costs. Second, obtaining universal information on administrative ownership is 
much easier and cheaper than obtaining universal information on legal ownership 
(something that actually does not make much sense when titling is voluntary). And 
third, the benefits from universal cadastral coverage would facilitate land tax collection, 
land use planning, voluntary land titling, and access to land projects. 
The other contented issue was the desirability of subsidies to support land-related 
private-sector entrepreneurial activities. It is surprising that there were no complaints 
towards the use of special higher taxes for activities that generate negative externalities, 
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which has exactly the same reasoning. We believe that the reason for rejection of 
subsidies comes from many years of scepticism, especially in Latin America, towards 
the viability of developing countries’ governments to correctly intervene on market 
failures. Or in other words, to the (neoliberal) view that government failures in 
developing countries tend to be worse than the market failures they try to resolve. We 
believe that, instead of just decreasing the size of the state, it is necessary to advance in 
getting a better functioning state, the now so common drive towards improving 
governance. This article can be seen as a proposal to move ahead on the agenda of 
improving governance in land - or real property - public administration systems. 
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